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Abstract—By providing effective access control mechanisms,
enterprise information security technologies have been proven
successful in protecting the confidentiality of sensitive information
in business organizations. However, such security mechanisms
typically reduce the work productivity of the staff, by making
them spend time working on non-project related tasks. Therefore,
organizations have to invest a signification amount of capital
in the information security technologies, and then to continue
incurring additional costs.
In this study, we investigate the performance of administra-
tors in an information help desk, and the non-productive time
(NPT) in an organization, resulting from the implementation of
information security technologies. An approximate analytical so-
lution is discussed first, and the loss of staff member productivity
is quantified using non-productive time. Stochastic Petri nets are
then used to provide simulation results.
The presented study can help information security managers
to make investment decisions, and to take actions toward reducing
the cost of information security technologies, so that a balance is
kept between information security expense, resource drain and
effectiveness of security technologies.
Keywords—Non-productive Time, Queuing Theory, Stochastic
Petri Nets, Security Investment Decision, Information Security
Technology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Many organizations have to maintain sensitive informa-
tion or documents that can only be accessed by authorized
personnel; for example, personal health records in medical
centers, and bank account details in financial organizations.
Confidential information leakage and sensitive information
distortion have been identified as one of the major information
security threats that cause reputation damage, identity theft,
and can even undermine the viability of the company [1]. It
is therefore essential that companies and organizations keep
such information and documents safe. Enterprise information
security technologies (e.g., USB access control solutions and
digital rights management software) have been developed to
address these concerns, for example, by using encryption to
restrict the access to protected document.
It is generally accepted that organizations have to invest
a signification amount of capital and continue to incur op-
erational expenditure in the area of enterprise information
security technologies. Moreover, since these technologies do
have negative effects on the efficiency of the organization,
it is necessary to demonstrate that the benefits arising from
their introduction exceed the costs of the information security
investment.
Information security research has been traditionally fo-
cused on the technologies and products; for example, the
architecture of the system, access control policies, and the
functionality of the products. Nowadays, however, human
behaviour has been identified as one of the critical factors
that determine the effectiveness of security measures, and
information security technologies can clearly impact the users
in a negative way [2], [3].
Information security technologies use access control mea-
sures (e.g., usernames and passwords) to limit unauthorized
use of data resources. However, due to various reason, even
authorized users might be unable to open a protected resource
they want to access. In such a case, they need to seek help
from the administrators employed by an organization. In this
paper, we will investigate performance both of the service
provision and human administrators in the organization, and
the productivity loss resulting from the implementation of
information security technologies.
There exist different methods for addressing security in-
vestment decision; for example, Beres et al. [4] and Beres-
nevichiene et al. [5] used mathematical models and stochastic
simulations to examine the effectiveness of security operation
processes and protection mechanisms. Beautement et al. [6]
proposed to use economic models based on trade-off between
information confidentiality, integrity and availability in order
to assess the effectiveness and value of security investment in
an information system. However, none of them considered the
cost of the administrators in the information help desk and
the non-productive time (NPT) in the organization. Zeng et
al. [7], [8], [9] proposed to use non-productive time (NPT) as
a standard tool to analyze the productivity loss, and the firing
delay of stochastic Petri nets to quantitatively evaluate the
NPT when implementing Digital Right Management (DRM)
products in the organization’s network. [9] indicted that an
important advantage of the implementation of an information
security technology is the reduction of unauthorized attempts
to access data resources, and NPT is an important intangible
cost of the organization. Zeng and Koutny [10] proposed
a formal model to capture the data loss (cost) in dynamic
environments. However, none of these studies analyzed the
performance and cost of administrators.
The main aim of the study reported in this paper is to
consider the trade-off between performance and security when
implementing information security technologies in the orga-
nization’s network. Firstly, an approximate analytical model
of the information security system comprising a server and
an administrator is proposed and evaluated using queuing the-
ory. A non-productive time (NPT) function for implementing
information security technologies is also given. Moreover, a
simulation model based on stochastic Petri nets is proposed
and evaluated. Secondly, we consider the case of multiple
administrators and provide suitable analytical and simulation
models which are then compared. Thirdly, a cost function
is proposed to analyze the effect of varying the number of
administrators in the information system. This study can help
an information security manager to estimate the necessary
number of administrators providing system support, and the
service capacity that has to be guaranteed by the organization
in order to satisfy a given number of users.
II. IMPLEMENTING INFORMATION SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
In [11], the authors survey the existing enterprise technolo-
gies that control access to confidential digital data (e.g., USB
access control solutions, digital rights management software,
and disk encryption techniques). The researched technologies
use endpoint access control as a means of limiting the main-
tenance overhead introduced by unauthorized devices. The
technologies are installed from a centralized security station,
sending client-side installations directly to user workstations.
They provide auditing options and prevent outsider access
through encryption. The various information security solutions
follow a model of centralized control, where access policies are
recorded at a single location from which they are passed to end
users when they interact with the network, and administrators
have the highest access rights. The various information security
measures rely on the cooperation of various people and system
components, thus carrying them out has an impact on the
overall productivity of the organization.
Fig. 1. Relationships between administrators, users and servers.
Figure 1 shows a possible model representing the relation-
ships between users, administrators and servers when imple-
menting information security technologies in the organization’s
network: (1) When a user tries to access resource, a request is
sent to the server. (2) The server attempts to validate the user
and, if the user does not pass the authentication procedure,
the user is denied the access the resource. (3) If the access is
denied, the user contacts the administrator asking for help. (4)
The administrator contacts the server. (5) If the user should be
allowed to access the resource, the administrator creates the
appropriate access rights for the user, or changes the usage
policy for this user in the server. (6) Finally, the administrator
sends the access rights to the user.
In our models and experiments presented in the rest of
this paper, we have adopted a simplified version of the model
depicted in Figure 1.
III. PETRI NETS AND STOCHASTIC ACTIVITY NETWORK
Petri nets are a graphical modelling tool for a formal de-
scription of systems whose dynamics are characterized by con-
currency, synchronization, mutual exclusion and conflict [12].
In particular, they have been widely used for structural mod-
elling of work-flows and have been applied in a wide range of
qualitative and quantitative analyzes [12], [13], [14], [15].
A basic Petri net N consists of two types of nodes, Pl
and Tr , respectively called places and transition, a set F ⊆
(Pl ×Tr)∪ (Tr ×Pl) of arcs that connect the nodes, and the
initial marking M0 : Pl → N which is a mapping from the set
of places to the set N of all non-negative integers.
Input arcs start at places and end at transitions, while output
arcs start at transitions and end at places. Places can contain
tokens, which are used to simulate the dynamic and concurrent
activities of the system modelled by the net. The current state
of the modelled system (a marking) is given by the number of
tokens in each place.
Transitions are the active components of the net. When
a transition is executed (or fired), it consumes tokens along
its input arcs, and produces tokens along its output arcs. The
resulting movement of the tokens changes the states of the
system. A transitions is only allowed to fire when it is enabled,
which means that each input place holds at least one token.
One can associate a firing delay with each transition of a
Petri net; such a delay specifies the time that the transition has
to be enabled before it can actually fire. If the delays are given
by a random distribution function, we obtain a stochastic Petri
net.
Stochastic Activity Networks (SANs) are a class of stochas-
tic Petri nets [16]. SANs consist of four primitive objects:
places, transitions, input gates and output gates. A place
represents a local state of the modelled system; a transition
represent an action that take some specified amount of time
to complete; input gates are used to control the enabling of
activities and define the marking changes that will occur when
an activity completes; and output gates are used to define the
marking changes that will occur when activities complete (in
particular, one can specify a probability with which a token is
produced and deposited in an output place).
A. Reward Models
Reward models are used to specify measures of system
behaviour [17]. A reward model has two different reward
components: one is concerned with ‘rate rewards’, that is, the
rate at which reward accumulates while the process is in a
specified set of markings during an interval of time; and the
other is concerned with ‘impulse rewards’, based on the count
of the number of times a transition fires during an interval of
time.
The functions used to capture the transition and marking
based rewards in a SAN, with places Pl and transitions Tr ,
are given as follows:
- C : Tr → R. For each a ∈ Tr , Ca denotes the reward
obtained due to the completion of transition a.
- R : P(Pl ,N) → R, where P(Pl ,N) is the set of all
partial functions from Pl to N. For each v ∈ P(Pl ,N),
R(v) denotes the rate of reward obtained when there
are n tokens in place pl, for every (pl, n) ∈ v.
Impulse rewards are associated with transition completion (via
C) and rates rewards are associated with the number of tokens








In the above, the reward accumulated is related to the number
of times each transition completes and time spent in par-
ticular markings, during a time interval [t, t + l]. For every
v ∈ P(Pl,N), Mv[t,t+l] represents the total time during the
interval [t, t + l] that the SAN is in markings such that there
are n tokens in pl, for each (pl, n) ∈ v. For each a ∈ Tr ,
Na[t,t+l] represents the number of completions of transition a
during the interval [t, t+ l].
IV. QUEUING NETWORK MODEL
Figure 2 shows an information security system modelled
by a simple queuing system with two queue stations (the server
and the administrator).
In the system, each user’s request is assumed to have a
duration specified by a negative exponential distribution with
a given mean: 1/ru is the frequency for a user send an access
request, 1/rser is the average time it takes the server to serve
a user’s request, and 1/ra is the average time it takes the
administrator to help a non-active user. N is the maximum
number of users admitted for processing. If there are more
than N requests present, the ones that do not occupy a thread
wait in an external FIFO queue.
In the diagram, p (0 < p ≤ 1) is the probability that a
user can pass the user authentication procedure on the server
and become an active user, 1− p is the probability that a user
cannot pass the user authentication and becomes an non-active
user who needs help from the administrator.
Fig. 2. A queuing theory model of an information security system.
Fig. 3. A closed queuing theory model of an information security system.
When the external queue is non-empty, the system behaves
like a closed queuing network (Figure 3), with N requests
circulating between the users and the system.
V. APPROXIMATE ANALYTICAL SOLUTION
Let us assume that there are k user requests circulating
between the server and the administrator (k = 1, . . . , N).
Suppose that the circulation continues for a long time, i.e.
the system reaches a steady state with k user requests. Then
the server queue would behave like an M/M/1 queue with a





Using the existing results [18] for the M/M/1/k queue yields











The steady state probability Πk that there are exactly k requests





Therefore, the state-dependent throughput of the server when










The probability User that the server is busy, given that there










The average response time, Wser , of a request that is admitted











Therefore, the state-dependent utility of the administrator when


















where, A = (1− p)k.
The average response time, Wadm , of a request that is






The non-productive time (NPT) in the organization is the
average number of requests in the server and administrator




+ Lser + Ladm)× l (11)
where l is the period of time users spend in the system, and
1/rq is the average time taken by a user to send an access
request.
A. Comparing Analytical and Simulation Results
We have compared the above approximate analytical so-
lution with simulation results obtained using the Möbius
system [16]. The performance of the system under different
loading conditions and parameter settings was examined in
a series of numerical and simulation experiments. The main
purpose of the simulations was to evaluate the accuracy of
the analytical solution and, at the same time, to validate the
modelling technique based on stochastic Petri nets.
Fig. 4. A stochastic Petri nets model of an information security system.
Informally, the middle transition produces a token with in one of the two
output places with probabilities p and 1− p, respectively.
Figure 4 shows the structure of a stochastic Petri nets model
representing information security scenario we discussed above.
The model consists of three places and three timed transitions.
Timed transitions are associated with random exponential dis-
tributed firing delays. Authorized Users try to access protected




time. We use Tu to control the frequency of access requests
sent to the Server by a user. The time taken to access the
protected resources is given by Tser . If the user can pass the
authentication process, then the user can use the resource, but
if the user cannot access the resource, the user has to contact
the Administrator for help. After obtaining such help (the
time taken is given by Tadm ), the user can try to access the
resource again.
The behaviour of the model can be measured by the
impulse rewards model and rate rewards model, which are
supported by the Möbius software. The throughput of a
transition is computed according to the formula which is
described in Section III,
∑
a∈Tr CaNa[t,t+l]. The number of
tokens in sets of places is computed according to the formula
∑
v∈P(Pl,N)R(v)Mv[t,t+l]. The time scale of the model is
expressed in minutes, i.e., when we run the model one time
unit in Möbius represents one minute in real working time.
To measure the throughput of the server, the throughput
of a transition per unit of time Tser was computed in average
interval of time, and then we could calculate the utility of the
server by using the equation (5). To measure the throughput of
the administrator, the throughput of the transition per unit of
time Tadm was computed in average interval of time, and then
we could calculate the utility of the administrator by using the
equation (8).
As the number of the parameters is quite high, some of
them were kept fixed throughout. These were: the probability
that a user passes the authentication procedure (p = 0.7); the
average time a user needs to send an access request ( 1ru =
100); and the average time it takes a user to send a request
( 1rq = 0.25).
Figure 5 shows the utility of the server against the number
of users for both the simulation and approximate analytical
approaches for various values of rser and ra. Increasing the
value of rser and ra corresponds to increasing the speed of
user access to the resource.
Fig. 5. Utility of the server w.r.t. the number of users in the system. p =
0.7, 1
ru
= 100. The utility increases significantly when the number of users
served by the server and administrator increases.
Figure 6 shows the utility of the administrator against the
numbers of the users for both the simulation and approximate
analytical approaches for various values of rser and ra. The
results show that there are obvious benefits from increasing
the server and administrator speed. If the target utilization of
the administrator is 0.72, with rser = 15 and ra = 4 one
can serve at most 640 users. After increasing the server rate
and administrator’s service rate to respectively rser = 30 and
ra = 8, the utility of the administrator can increase to 0.71,
which is close to the target with 1280 users.
Let us now consider one year of work after the deployment
of the information security technologies in the network system
of an organization, i.e., we consider 96000 time units in
the stochastic Petri net model (this corresponds to 40 weeks
of work, each working week having 40 working hours). To
measure the NPT, the time users spend in any place other than
Fig. 6. Utility of the administrator w.r.t. the number of users in the system.
p = 0.7, 1
ru
= 100. The utility increases significantly when the number of
users served by the server and administrator increases.
Users is computed. The NPT also includes the time the user
takes for sending an access request ( 1rq ).
Figure 7 shows the NPT of the system w.r.t. the number of
users for various values of rser and ra. Increasing the value
of rser and ra is equivalent to increasing the speed of users
access to the resource. The NPT includes: the time spent on
sending an access request and authentication procedures, and
the time spent on waiting for a response from administrator.
Fig. 7. Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment
of information security technologies. p = 0.7, 1
ru
= 100. NPT increases
significantly when the number of users served by the system increases.
If the target maximum NPT is 120000 time units, one can
try to build the system with rser = 15 and ra = 4. Then the
system can serve 320 users and the NPT is around 102653
time units which is below the target. However, if we increase
the rates to rser = 30 and ra = 8, the system can serve 640
users and the NPT is around 102669 time units.
VI. MULTIPLE ADMINISTRATORS
In the above, we proposed an approximate analytical model
for implementing information security technologies. We con-
sidered one server and one administrator. In what follows, we
consider multiple administrators who provide help with access
control problems.
We assume that there are K administrators, each of which
can serve one user request at a time, independently of the
others (Figure 8). We want to know if it is beneficial to increase
the number of administrators, or to increase the operational
speed of the administrators. It is well known that for an
M/M/K queue, it is preferable to have one administrator
serving at the rate µ rather than K administrators serving at
the rate µ/K [18]. This is because if there are fewer than K
requests in the queue, then some of the administrators will be
idle, thus reducing the overall service rate.
Fig. 8. A closed queuing theory model of an information security system,
with N users and K administrators.
Consider first the administrator subsystem, with j re-
quests circulating between the server and administrators, j =
0, 1, . . . , (1− p)N , where N is the maximum number of user
requests, and p is the probability that a user can pass the user
authentication on the server.
Suppose that the circulation continues for a long time and
the subsystem reaches a steady state with j requests. If there
is one administrator in the system and j user requests in the
subsystem, the approximation becomes an M/M/1/./A queue
(A = (1− p)N ). Hence the balance equations become [18]:
(A− j)ruΠj = raΠj+1, 1 ≤ j ≤ A (12)
where Πj is the steady state probability that there are exactly
j user requests waiting for a response from the administrator.
Now we increase the number of parallel administrators in
the model. The model becomes an M/M/K/./A queue, where
K is the number of administrators. Therefore, the balance
equations become [18]:
(A− j)ruΠj = (j + 1)raΠj+1, 0 ≤ j < K (13)
(A− j)ruΠj = KraΠj+1, K ≤ j < A (14)




























Each of the users submits requests to administrators at the rate
(1−p)ru
p . Therefore, the throughput Tadm is [18]:












The non-productive time (NPT) in the organization can be
calculated using the equation (11).
A. Comparing Analytical and Simulation Results
We again used the Möbius software [16], [20] to simulate
the behaviour of the approximate analytical model, and to
compare the simulation and analytical results.
Figure 9 shows the structure of a stochastic Petri net for the
analytical model we have just discussed, which consists of five
places, four timed transitions, and one instantaneous transition.
Authorized Users try to access resources every 1ru time units
during working hours (the time taken is given by Tser ). If the
user cannot access the resource, administrators are contacted
for help. Here we use Thelp to control the probability with
which the users are handled by different administrators. There
are eight administrators (Adm1, . . ., Adm8), each of which can
serve one user request at a time, independently of the others.
The throughput and average response time can be computed
as in Section V-A.
Fig. 9. A stochastic Petri nets model of an information security system with
eight administrators. Note that the ‘thin’ transition with eight output places
takes no time to execute, i.e. it is instantaneous.
As before, some parameters were kept fixed: the probability
that a user passes the authentication procedure (p = 0.7); the
frequency with which a user sends access requests ( 1ru = 100)
(i.e., a user sends a request every 100 time units); and the
average time it takes for a user to send an access request ( 1rq =
0.25).
Figure 10 shows the average load on the administrators
against the number of users for K = 8 with ra = 0.5, and
K = 4 with ra = 1.
Figure 11 shows the average response time of the admin-
istrators w.r.t. the numbers of user for K = 8 with ra = 0.5,
and K = 4 with ra = 1.
Consider now one year of the deployment of the infor-
mation security technology in the network system, i.e., 96000
time units in the stochastic Petri net model.
Figure 12 shows the NPT of the system w.r.t. the numbers
of users for ra = 0.5 with K = 8, and ra = 1 with K =
Fig. 10. Average load on the administrators w.r.t. the number of users in the
system. p = 0.7, 1
ru
= 100, rser = 15.
Fig. 11. Average response time of the administrators w.r.t. the number of
users in the system. p = 0.7, 1
ru
= 100, rser = 15.
4. NPT increased significantly when the service speed of the
administrators is slow; in other words, increasing the speed of
the administrators reduces the NPT of the staff members in
the organization.
Fig. 12. Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment of
information security technologies. p = 0.7, 1
ru
= 100, rser = 15.
Figure 13 shows the NPT of the system w.r.t. the number
of administrators with 400 users in the system. The system
reaches a steady state with five administrators in the system.
Increasing the number of administrators will reduce the NPT
in the organization. However, the administrators will often be
idle in such a case.
Fig. 13. Total non-productive time (NPT) associated with the deployment
of information security technologies. p = 0.7, 1
ru
= 100, rser = 15, N =
400, ra = 0.25.
VII. THE COST MODEL FOR ADMINISTRATORS
Now we introduce a cost function which needs to be
optimized. This function is based on the assumption that there
is a cost of the users’ waiting time and a competing cost
of providing resources, e.g., salaries of administrators, and
administrators’ training expenditure. This gives rise to the
following simple cost function [18], [19]:
C = c1Ladm + c2Kra, c1, c2 ≥ 0 (18)
The cost rates ci(i = 1, 2) are non-negative constant, which
are dependent on the particular system, or depend on the
type of quality of service contract that is in place. If c1 is
large, in order to keep the total cost C low, Ladm should
be small [18]. At the same time, if c2 is large, in order
to keep the total cost C low, Kra should be small [18].
However, the coefficients ci(i = 1, 2) are not necessarily
optimal, because the load of the administrators also plays a
key role in determining the best strategy, since the service time
and the number of administrators also influence the load of the
administrators. In general, if the organizations want to improve
the responsiveness of the system, they would increase c1, and
if they want to minimize running costs, they would increase
c2.
A. Analytical Results
We now illustrate the cost function we proposed above
using the previous analytical results. Figure 14 shows the
cost w.r.t. the number of users. It is clear that under the
parameter values with ra = 0.25, the cost rises rapidly at
around 320 users, which is the approximate maximum capacity
the administrators can handle before the performance starts to
degrade. Under the parameter values with ra = 0.5, the cost
rises at around 640 users. Therefore, doubling the service rate
from ra = 0.25 to ra = 0.5 effectively doubles the capacity
of the system. In a small system, when N < 320, the cost
function is dominated by c2Kra. Therefore, the cost is greater
for faster administrators. The reason is that the administrators
will often be idle, and the system is not making efficient use
of resources.
Fig. 14. The cost w.r.t. the number of users calculated by the queuing network
model. p = 0.7, 1
ru
= 100, rser = 15,K = 8, c1 = 0.5, c2 = 1.
Figure 15 shows the cost w.r.t. the number of users. It
is easy to see, under the parameter values with ra = 0.25,
the cost rises rapidly at around 320 users for all cases (c2 =
0.1, 1, 10).
Fig. 15. The cost w.r.t. the number of users calculated by the queuing network
model. p = 0.7, 1
ru
= 100, rser = 15,K = 8, ra = 0.25, c1 = 0.5.
Figure 16 shows the cost w.r.t. the number of administrators
in the system. In this experiment, the number of users is fixed.
The larger c2 results in a decreasing cost before the optimal
point and an increasing rate after the point. For 400 users,
in the case of c2 = 1 the optimal value is K = 17, which
gives the minimal cost of 9.62. In the case of c2 = 10 the
optimal value is K = 10, which gives the minimal cost of
35.29. When information security managers make the trade-
off between security and cost, the balance point here is the
value of K where the cost is minimal. Therefore, the security
manager could choose K = 17 and K = 10 when c2 = 1 and
c2 = 10, respectively.
Fig. 16. The cost w.r.t. the number of administrators. p = 0.7, 1
ru
=
100, rser = 15, N = 400, ra = 0.25, c1 = 0.5.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we provided an approximate analytical model
for investigating different implementations of information se-
curity technologies. We have also provided a corresponding
simulation model based on stochastic Petri nets. The two
approaches have been compared through a series of experi-
ments which demonstrated that the results they can supply are
very similar. Hence one can conclude that the approximate
analytical solution is sound. Moreover, we can conclude that
the simulation technique based on stochastic Petri nets can be
relied upon when it comes to the evaluation of, e.g., productiv-
ity loss caused by the introduction of security technologies. In
future we plan to apply it to system organizations which extend
the simple scenarios captured by Figure 1; in particular, those
that involve a hierarchy of servers and administrators.
We proposed functions to estimate the non-productive time
(NPT) in an organization resulting from the implementation of
security technologies, and the cost function for the adminis-
trators in the information help desk.
Queuing theory was used to numerically analyze the imple-
mentaion of information security technologies, and stochastic
Petri nets were used to simulate the approach. The effect
of several controllable parameters on the performance of the
system was examined in a series of numerical and simulation
experiments. Such a study can help information security man-
agers to make information security investment decision.
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models,” in Proceedings of the 9th International Workshop on Petri
Nets and Performance Models (PNPM’01), ser. PNPM ’01, 2001, pp.
251–260.
